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a b s t r a c t
Security and trust represent two different perspectives on the problem of guaranteeing the
correct interaction among software components.
Gate automata have been proposed as a formalism for the specification of both security
and trust policies in the scope of the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust (S×C×T) framework.
Indeed, they watch the execution of a target program, possibly modifying its behaviour,
and produce a feedback for the trust management system. The level of trust changes
the environment settings by dynamically activating/deactivating some of the defined
gate automata.
The goal of this paper is to present gate automata and to show a gate automata-driven
strategy for the run-time enforcement in the S× C× T.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last few decades, the number of devices used in our daily life has been rapidly growing. Also, the computational
capabilities of such devices have increased over and over. Beyond the clear advantages for their users, e.g., in terms of
reachability and connectivity, this trend has also exposed them to new vulnerabilities and security threats. Often, the users
try to mitigate these risks using some informal, trust-based evaluation for avoiding interactions with potentially malicious
agents.
Here we mainly focus on the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust (S × C × T) [1], i.e., a contract-based approach able to
manage the trust levels of the applications and guarantee the security requirements at run-time.
In this paperwe show an implementation of the S×C×T framework run-time support using gate automata. We advocate
gate automata as a unique formalism for dealing with security and trust [2]. In particular, we show how they can be used for
encoding both applications’ contracts and security policies in the S× C× T implementation. Roughly, after downloading an
application from a remote provider, according to its identity, we associate the code to a certain trust domain. The lower the
level of trust is, the stronger, i.e., the more restrictive, is the security policy we enforce on the application. While executing
the application, the run-time enforcement support controls its behaviour. If a violation occurs, i.e., the application tries
to perform an action that is not allowed by the current security configuration, the enforcement system reacts, possibly
decreasing the level of trust of the application. Trust updating may lead to a reorganisation of the run-time enforcement
mechanism that may enforce a different, e.g., more restrictive, security policy.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a gate automata definition and the ConSpec contract policy
language by showing how the semantics of the latter can be given through the former. Section 3 shows the structure of
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a S× C× T implementation using gate automata. Section 4 compares our work with others in the literature and Section 5
concludes the paper with some considerations about the future research directions in this field.
2. Gate automata
In this section we formally introduce gate automata and their properties. We also show the ConSpec [3] language by
recalling its syntax and by giving its semantics in terms of gate automata.
Definition 2.1. A gate automaton G is a 4-tuple ⟨V , ı, A, T ⟩ where: V is a finite set of states; ı ∈ V is the initial state; A is a
set of actions (A¯ being the set of the complementary actions of A); T ⊆ V × (A∪ A¯∪{N,H})×V is a set of labelled transitions
such that:
1. (v, a, u) ∈ T ∧ (v, b, w) ∈ T ∧ a = b ⇐⇒ u = w
2. ∀(v, a, u) ∈ T .a ∈ A¯ ∪ {N,H} =⇒ @b, w. b ≠ a ∧ (v, b, w) ∈ T .
A gate automaton processes a sequence of actions, possiblymodifying it. The transitions of the automaton can be labelled
with input (i.e., α ∈ A) or output (i.e., α¯ ∈ A¯) actions. An input action is generated by some action source, e.g., a running
program, while output actions are fired by the automaton itself. Gate automata can also perform two special operations,
N and H, which, respectively, increase and decrease the trust weight corresponding to the source of the actions. Where it
improves the readability, we use v
α−→ w in place of (v, α,w) ∈ T and v α9 for @w.(v, α,w) ∈ T .
2.1. Gate automata and interface automata
A gate automaton can be instantiated to a corresponding interface automaton [4]. Hence, we use interface automata for
giving an operational semantics to the security policies defined through our gate automata.
Definition 2.2. An instantiation of a gate automaton G over an index k, denoted by Gk, is an interface automaton P =
⟨VP , {ı}, AIk , AOk+1, {N,H}, TP⟩where:
• VP = V ∪ Vid is the finite set of states (where Vid = {vαid : v ∈ V ∧ v α9 ∧∀β ∈ A¯ ∪ {N,H}.v β9})
• AIk = {⟨α, k⟩ : α ∈ A} is the input alphabet;
• AOk+1 = {⟨α, k+ 1⟩ : α ∈ A} is the output alphabet;• TP is a set of transitions defined as:
TP = {(v, ⟨α, k⟩, w) : (v, α,w) ∈ T } ∪ {(v, ⟨α, k+ 1⟩, w) : (v, α¯, w) ∈ T }
∪ {(v,, w) : (v, , w) ∈ T } ∪ {(v, ⟨α, k⟩, vαid) : vαid ∈ Vid}
∪ {(vαid, ⟨α, k+ 1⟩, v) : vαid ∈ Vid}
where  ∈ {N,H}.
The semantics of an instantiation Gk of a gate automatonG is defined in terms of reaction sequences. Intuitively, a reaction
sequence is a trace of output and internal actions fired by an interface automaton after reading one input symbol. We start
by extending the definition of execution fragment [4] as follows.
Definition 2.3. An execution fragment of an interface automaton P is a possibly infinite, alternating sequence of states and
actions v0, α0, v1, α1, . . . such that (vi, αi, vi+1) ∈ TP .
Definition 2.4. Given an interface automaton P = ⟨VP , V initP , AIP , AOP , AHP , TP⟩, an action α ∈ AIP and a state v ∈ VP , a reaction
sequence to α in v is a possibly infinite trace of actions σ = α0, α1, . . . such that
• αi ∈ AOP ∪ AHP ,• ∃v, v0, v1, . . . ∈ VP such that v, α, v0, α0, v1, α1, . . . is an execution fragment of P and
• if σ has finite length n then ∀β ∈ AOP ∪ AHP .vn β9.
We say that α is an activator of σ in v and denote it with v=⇒σα vn if σ is finite or v=⇒σα ↑ otherwise.
2.2. Trace validity
In this section we provide a formal definition of compliance of a trace with respect to a gate automaton. Intuitively, we
can imagine that a sequence of actions is allowed by a gate automaton if, passing it as the input of the (instantiation of the)
automaton, the output is the unchanged sequence. We formally define this notion in terms of reaction sequences in the
following way.
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Fig. 1. The syntax of ConSpec preamble, security state (left) and clauses (right).
Definition 2.5. Given a finite trace of actions σ = α1, . . . , αn and a gate automaton G = ⟨V , ı, A, T ⟩we say that σ isweakly
compliant with G, in symbols σ ⊢ G, if and only if for any instantiation Gk of G we have ı=⇒σ
k+1
1
⟨α1,k⟩ v1 · · · =⇒
σ k+1n
⟨αn,k⟩ vn such
that σ k+1i = ⟨βi,1, k+ 1⟩ · · · ⟨βi,mi , k+ 1⟩ and fout(σ k+11 · · · σ k+1n ) = σ where fout is the function recursively defined as
fout(σσ ′) = fout(σ )fout(σ ′) fout(⟨α, h⟩) = α fout(⟨, h⟩) = ·
· being the empty trace and  ∈ {N,H}.
Beyond the technical definition, the weak compliance of a trace with respect to a gate automaton is quite intuitive.
In particular, we can see the weak compliance as the dual of transparency. That is, a trace weakly complies with
a gate automaton if and only if an external observer cannot understand whether the trace has been processed by
(the instantiation of) the automaton or not.
Clearly, weak compliance does not correspond to a full transparency. Indeed, the transitions of the automaton can
introduce and delete actions in such a way that a trace is kept unchanged as a whole, but its prefixes are modified. For
characterising sequences that are not modified at all by a gate automaton we use the notion of strong compliance.
Definition 2.6. Given a finite trace of actions σ = α1, . . . , αn and a gate automatonG = ⟨V , ı, A, T ⟩we say that σ is strongly
compliant with G, in symbols σ |= G, if and only if for any prefix σ ′ of σ holds that σ ′ ⊢ G.
2.3. Gate automata and ConSpec
The Contract Specification Language [3], ConSpec for short, has been proposed as a formalism for defining both
behavioural contracts and security policies. Roughly, the syntax of ConSpec resembles the statements of an imperative
programming language. Here we recall the syntax of ConSpec and we show how ConSpec specifications can be translated
into corresponding gate automata. Note that, for simplicity, we omit a few details of the original ConSpec syntax irrelevant
for our purposes.
2.3.1. ConSpec syntax
Briefly, a ConSpec specification is composed by three blocks: (i) a preamble, (ii) a security state and (iii) a finite list of
clauses. The preamble just declares the range of values for the used variables (MAXINT and MAXLEN).1 The security state is
a list of variable declarations following the schema τx ::= vwhere τ ∈ {bool, int, string} is a type, x is a variable name
and v is a value of type τ . Note that here types are bounded, i.e., they represent a finite number of values. For instance, if we
set MAXINT to 3 then integer values range in {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Each clause contains a parametric action α(τy), activating the rule, and a list of conditional instructions. Action names
belong to a denumerable set Λ, i.e., α ∈ Λ, and types are the same as for the security state. The left side of the conditional
instructions is a decidable, Boolean guard g defining a property of the security state and action parameter, while the right
side is an update statement u (i.e., a possibly empty block of variable assignments). We assume all the guards of a single
clause to be pairwise disjoint, i.e., if g and g ′ belong to the same clause then it never happens that g ∧ g ′ is verified. Fig. 1
shows the syntax described above. The structure of the security clauses needs a further dissertation. Indeed, comparing
it with the standard one [3], we see two main differences: (i) we only have before-event checks (i.e., we do not use the
keywords AFTER and EXCEPTIONAL) and (ii) we use monadic actions. We claim that these simplifications do not reduce
the expressive power of the ConSpec language. As a finite number of parameters can be encoded in a single one, using
monadic actions is not a restriction. For instance, we could use strings to encode n-argument actions (e.g., α(‘‘3, msg, false’’)
for α(3, ‘‘msg’’, false)). For the sake of simplicity, we refer to this encoding in our examples and we assume we have the
functions getPar_τ : int× string → τ , such that getPar_τ(i, s) returns the i-th parameter (having type τ ) encoded in s.
Also, we require all the variable and parameter names to be unique and all the clauses to be triggered by different actions.
1 The standard ConSpec syntax also contains statements defining the scope of a policy, i.e., Session, Multisession and Global. However, it is
immaterial for our purposes and we can simply neglect it.
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Moreover,we can simulate the behaviour ofAFTER andEXCEPTIONAL clauses by introducing newactions. As amatter of
fact, the standard syntax of ConSpec is oriented to model the computations of object-oriented systems, i.e., passing through
method invocations. Every method triggers the clauses when it is invoked, when it returns a result and, possibly, when
raising an exception. Then, for eachmethod mwe can define three actionsαBm, α
A
m andα
E
m representing themethod invocation,
standard return and exceptional return, respectively.
Example 2.1. Consider the policy saying ‘‘An application cannot open connections after reading local files’’. We model the
involved methods through the actions fopen(int mode) and copen(string url) where mode ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is a two-bit
mask representing the access type (i.e., 00 = none, 01 = read, 10 = write and 11 = read and write), and url is a network
address. The resulting policy is:
MAXINT 3
MAXLEN 0
SECURITY STATE
bool accessed ::= false;
BEFORE fopen(int mode) PERFORM
(mode == 1) -> {accessed ::= true;}
(mode == 3) -> {accessed ::= true;}
(mode == 0 || mode == 2) -> {}
BEFORE copen(string url) PERFORM
!accessed -> {}
2.3.2. Gate automata interpretation of ConSpec
The semantics of ConSpec can be interpreted using gate automata. Given a state q and a guard g , we say that g is valid in
q(q ⊢ g) if and only if replacing the variable names of g using the mapping defined by q we obtain a tautology. Moreover,
we say that an update block u denotes a function, namely [[u]], from states to states, i.e., [[u]] : Q → Q .
We obtain a gate automaton from a ConSpec specification as follows.
States. The set Q of states is fully characterised by the security states and the action parameters. In particular, we define
a state q as a mapping from variable and parameter names to the lifted domain of possible values. Formally, given a variable
or parameter name x, then q(x) = v with v ∈ Val∪ {⊥} (where Val = int∪ bool∪ string). Moreover, to be valid a state
must assign to each variable a value different from⊥ and to at most one parameter a value that is different from⊥. Hence,
Q is the set of all the possible, valid combinations of assignments. Note that, as ConSpec uses bounded types, the number of
states is always finite.
Initial state. The initial state ı ∈ Q is the set mapping the variables of the security state to their initial values and the
parameters to the undefined,⊥ value.
Alphabet. The set of events A that the automaton can read is the set of pairs {⟨α, v⟩ | α ∈ Λ ∧ v ∈ Val}. We use α(v)
instead of ⟨α, v⟩where unambiguous.
Transitions. We build the set T of transitions in the following way. For each ConSpec clause we take the triggering action
α(τx) and we list all the states q ∈ Q such that q(x) = ⊥. Then we proceed as follows.
1. For each possible event α(v)we add a transition from q
α¯(v)−−→ q′, where ∀y ≠ x.q′(y) = q(x) and q′(x) = v.
2. For each conditional instruction g → u of the clause and for each of the freshly added transitions, if q′ ⊢ g then we add
a transition q′ α(v)−−→ [[u]](q).
3. For all the states q˙ such that x = ⊥ and for all the events α(v˙) such that q˙ α¯(v˙)9 , we add a transition q˙ α¯(v˙)−−→ q˙.
We iterate these steps until every clause has been processed.
Example 2.2. We create a gate automaton for the specification in Example 2.1.
Fig. 2 shows the gate automaton produced by the procedure described above. Rows and columns denote the values
of variables for the automaton states, for instance the top row contains the states q such that q(accessed) = false.
The leftmost column contains the states assigning no values to the action parameters. The unreachable state in position
accessed = true, url = ‘‘ ’’, which would correspond to a specification violation, has been removed. Also, two pairs of
columns, i.e., mode = 0/2 and mode = 1/3, have been grouped as their states share the same behaviour. Finally, we did not
draw immaterial self-loops, i.e., representing transitions that cannot take place.
Clearly, the procedure described above can be optimised in several ways, e.g., removing unreachable states or collapsing
groups of equivalent states. Nevertheless, our purpose is to show that gate automata can be suitably used to encode ConSpec
policies and contracts.
The following property ensures that gate automata correctly encode ConSpec specifications.
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Fig. 2. The conversion of a ConSpec specification into a gate automaton.
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Fig. 3. The Security-by-Contract-with-Trust Workflow.
Property. Given a ConSpec specification S and the gate automaton G obtained through the procedure defined above, then a trace
σ complies with S if and only if it also complies with G.
Proof (Sketch). Intuitively, we build the ConSpec automaton for S as described in [3]. Then, we show that there exists a
bijective mapping among the states and the transitions of the ConSpec automaton and the those of the gate automaton.
Finally, we proceed by induction on the length of σ , showing that the outputs of the two automata reading σ are the
same. 
The previous property guarantees that gate automata can be suitably used for implementing ConSpec-based security
frameworks. In the next section we exploit this property for defining a security enforcement model.
3. Implementing the S×C×T runtime through gate automata
The S × C × T has been originally presented in [1,5] as a unique framework for managing both security and trust in a
computing environment. It uses two behavioural specifications: the contract of an application and the policy of the hosting
platform. Intuitively, a contract declares and exhaustively describes the possible behaviours of an application. Instead, a
policy represents all the behaviours that the execution environment will accept as legal from a running program. Usually,
the application vendors provide the contracts while the platform owners/administrators define the policies.
The S × C × T workflow, depicted in Fig. 3, shows the two phases of the application deployment process: the
trustworthiness evaluation and the assignment to a security domain.When an application enters the deployment procedure,
i.e., before its first execution, the trust module decides about the trustworthiness of the code provider. This amounts to
accepting the trustworthiness of the contract and its source.
If this check is not passed, i.e., the system rejects the vendor’s trustworthiness, then the application runs in the scope of
the policy enforcement mechanism. Otherwise, if the trust check successes, the system checkswhether the contract complies
with the security policy. In the case of compliance, the system executes the application under a contract monitoring setting.
While the policy enforcement process prevents the security violations, the monitoring facility keeps under control the
possible contract violations. When a running program violates its contract, i.e., it tries to behave in an undeclared way,
the system reacts by changing the trust level of the application provider.
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Here we introduce an implementation of the S × C × T runtime support using gate automata. According to the
S × C × T standard model [5], applications run in the scope of one of the two security domains described above. In both
cases, running programs are dynamically checked for compliance with respect to their contract (i.e., contract monitoring
process). Moreover, the applications watched by the policies enforcement facility are checked for possible policy violations.
The platform owners declare their security policies through gate automata either directly or translating ConSpec policies
(see Section 2.3.2). Instead, we assume that the contracts are always specified through ConSpec.
Starting from a ConSpec contract, we build a corresponding gate automaton by following the procedure for policies
presented in the previous section. The only difference is that here we replace the third step of the transitions creation
procedure with
3. For all states q˙ s.t. x = ⊥ and for all events α(v˙) s.t. q˙ α¯(v˙)9 , we add a fresh, new state q⋆ in Q and a pair of transitions
q˙
α¯(v˙)−−→ q⋆ and q⋆ H−→ q˙ in T .
In this way, as expected, a contract violation leads to a trust penalty. This behaviour implements the S× C× T reaction
to the contract violations.
We use the gate automata specifications of policies and contracts for implementing the S× C× T runtime environment.
We consider a program R as a source of the security-relevant actions, which are the side effects of the programs’ executions.
Moreover, we assume the enforcement environment to be effective, i.e., R can be suspended before the actual execution of
the operation corresponding to the ongoing action. For instance, if R tries to access a resource, so raising an access action, it
actually obtains the permission only after checking the security settings.
The first component of the enforcement environment is the trust management system (TMS). This component handles the
trust weights associated to each agent and provides an implementation of the two internal actions N and H. While following
the execution of its target, the enforcement environment can perform one ormore actions of typeN andH. The TMS receives
these signals and increases (decreases) the target trust level. Note that some TMSs use a finer characterisation of rewards
and penalties, i.e., more than two actions. Nevertheless, this behaviour is fully compatible with our model. Indeed, we can
easily extend the set of internal actions or simulate it by adding more consecutive transitions.
The enforcement environment also contains a set of gate automata G1, . . . ,Gn composing the policy pool (PP). The
automata in the policy pool are associated to a certain level of trust 0 ⩽ t ⩽ 1 on which they are inversely ordered,
i.e., 1 ⩽ i < j ⩽ n implies that ti > tj. We also insert the gate automaton obtained from the contract of R in PP. The
level of trust of this automaton is always equal to 1 and it is the first in the ordering.
When a target R, having trust level tR, starts its execution, the policy pool instantiates all the gate automata Gi such that
ti ⩾ tR to the corresponding interface automata Gii (see Section 2). Then, the resulting interface automata are composed to
create an interface automata stack which is applied to R. Note that the automaton obtained from the contract of R is always
in the first position of the stack, i.e., the stack bottom.
The stack receives the actions performed by R and processes them by passing the reaction sequences of each automaton
to the layer above. In more detail, assuming that the current state of each interface automaton Gii is vi, every layer of the
stack follows this procedure:
1. Gii receives a trace σ
i from the level below;
2. for each element ⟨•, i⟩ of σ i execute the following sub steps:
(a) if • = N (H) then require the TMS to increase (decrease) tR.
(b) otherwise, if • = α compute vi=⇒σ i+1⟨α,i⟩ v′i and pass the control to the layer above (by invoking this procedure);
3. return the control to the level below.
When R fires some action α, the previous steps are executed starting from the first layer, representing the contract of R, with
σ 1 = ⟨α, 1⟩. The output of the last layer (after removing the index k) is a sequence of reactions that have been stimulated
by α, that is, the enforcement result.
As the actions pass through the stack levels, the TMS receives trust adjustment signals. As a consequence, the TMSupdates
tR, possibly causing the system to add or remove one or more automata in the stack.
4. Related work
Some works about the integration between trust management and security enforcement are present in the literature.
However, few of them deal with mobile applications. Koshutanski et al. [6] present an access control system enhancing
the Globus toolkit standard support. Their proposal copes with the performances issues arising from the access rights
management support of Globus for shared resources in the Grid architecture. Along this line of research [7] presents an
integrated architecture, extending the previous one, with an inference engine managing reputation and trust credentials.
This framework is extended again in [8] where a trust credential negotiation module is introduced to overcome some
scalability problems. In this way, the new framework guarantees the privacy credentials and the security policies of both
users and providers. Even though the application scenario and the implementation are different, the basic idea consists of a
trust-based metrics used for deciding about the reliability of an application provider.
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The automata-based specification of security policies has a long-standing tradition. In [9], the author advocates security
automata for defining security requirements and for implementing the corresponding controllers. We can observe that
gate automata extend the automata of [9] in twoways: (i) they can add and remove actions from the target’s execution trace
(rather than simply halt it) and (ii) they also use special actions for the trust management. For this reason, in [2] we showed
that gate automata can be encoded using edit automata [10]. Gate automata differ from edit automata mainly because they
manage trust. Indeed, they integrate the trust management process and the enforcement mechanism in a unique model.
Moreover, they inherit the compositionality properties of interface automata [4]. Hence, reasoning about the composition
of gate automata is generally simpler than for edit automata.
Also [11] proposes an automaton-based specification, i.e., usage automata, of security policies, i.e., usage policies. Usage
automata slightly differ fromsecurity automata. Roughly, an execution trace complieswith ausagepolicy iff it is not accepted
as an input word by the corresponding usage automaton. Moreover, usage policies are applied directly to the source code
through proper syntactical operators that also cause the composition of policies through scope nesting. Again, the main
differences with respect to our automata are that (i) usage automata do not change the observed trace and (ii) they do
not handle trust. Furthermore, in the environment using gate automata the scope of a policy is not fixed but policies are
activated/deactivated according to the trust values.
In [12] the authors present a method for modelling security automata through process algebra operators. They extend
some existing results on process algebras to the analysis, verification and synthesis of secure systems. Also in [13,14] a
process algebra-based language, namely POLPA, is used for policy specification and enforcement. In general, process algebras
are more expressive than finite state automata. However, these works propose no integration between security and trust.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper we presented gate automata for specifying integrated security and trust policies. We also compared our
proposal with ConSpec showing that gate automata can be suitably used for specifying both policies and contracts. Finally,
we proposed an implementation model for the S× C× T runtime support.
As future work, we aim at investigating model checking techniques for gate automata. This will extend the present work
with the static verification module necessary for a full implementation of the S × C × T. We are also interested in the
theoretical aspects of the parallel composition of gate automata. Indeed, the current enforcement environment uses a stack-
based composition. This structure does not take into account concurrency. Hence, we would like to study the possibility of
composing two or more automata stacks for extending our model to concurrent programming models.
The implementation of a prototype is currently under investigation. In [5] we presented simulation results showing the
feasibility of our trust management strategy. In particular, we showed that our proposal implementation rapidly converges
when some attacks take place. In [15,16] two enforcement environments using ConSpec have been introduced. Both these
implementations have good performances and guarantee the feasibility of the enforcementmethod towhichwe are aligned.
In our opinion, these results represent more than optimistic premises for our model.
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